



INTERNATIONAL BOND MARKETS, RISK PREMIUMS 







The Schumpeter School of Business and Economics 




In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor Rerum Oeconomicarum 






Resident in Wuppertal 




Chairman of the Doctoral Candidate Admissions Board: 
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Braukmann 
Dean of the Faculty of Management and Economics: 
Prof. Dr. Nils Crasselt  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Paul Welfens 
Co-advisor: Prof. Dr. André Betzer 
Wuppertal, May 2020 
  




















my wife Gülcan, 











This dissertation is based on three papers which I prepared during my doctoral 
studies at the Schumpeter School of Business and Economics at the University 
of Wuppertal.  
I am particularly indebted to my supervisor and first examiner of my 
dissertation, Professor Dr. Paul J.J. Welfens. His continuous counsel and 
guidance during the writing of the aforementioned papers are highly valued 
and have contributed significantly to the success of this thesis. Furthermore, I 
am very grateful to Professor Dr. Paul J.J. Welfens for giving me the chance 
to cooperate on several research projects of the European Institute for 
International Economic Relations (EIIW), such as a EIIW research project 
sponsored by the Deutsche Bundesbank, during the course of which I got the 
opportunity both to connect with experts and to present and discuss my work 
at several workshops and conferences at which I received valuable feedback. 
I am also grateful to Professor Dr. André Betzer, the second examiner of my 
dissertation, for his valuable support especially with regard to the first paper of 
this dissertation. Additionally, I would like to thank the staff of Professor Dr. 
André Betzer, namely Dr. Dmitry Bazhutov and Samed Krüger, for their 
comments and data support. 
I highly appreciate the support of friends and colleagues at the EIIW and the 
University of Wuppertal - Arthur Korus, Fabian Baier, David Hanrahan, Tian 
Xiong and Christina Wiens. Special thanks for editing goes to David Hanrahan.  
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for supporting me mentally 
and emotionally throughout the process of writing this dissertation. Last but not 
least, I am deeply indebted to my wife, Gülcan, and my sons, Kenan and Deniz, 
who put up with me through the many days and nights that I spent on this 
project.  
 





Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................... III 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................ IV 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Basic Perspectives and Motivation .............................................................. 1 
1.2 Overview ...................................................................................................... 8 
1.3 References .................................................................................................. 11 
2. The Effects of Brexit on Credit Spreads: Evidence from UK and Eurozone 
Corporate Bond Markets ........................................................................................ 14 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 14 
2.2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature ........................................ 16 
2.3 Data Description ........................................................................................ 22 
2.4 Econometric Analysis ................................................................................ 24 
2.4.1 Event Study Methodology ..................................................................... 24 
2.4.2 Estimation Results ................................................................................. 29 
2.4.3 Additional Brexit-related Events ........................................................... 40 
2.5 Time-varying Aspects ................................................................................ 43 
2.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 54 
2.7 Appendix A ................................................................................................ 57 
2.8 References .................................................................................................. 58 
3. EU28 Capital Market Perspectives of a Hard BREXIT: Theory, Empirical 
Findings and Policy Options ................................................................................... 62 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 62 
3.2 Forecast Revisions in the UK and Selected Welfare Aspects of Brexit .... 65 
3.3 Theoretical Perspectives of Capital Market Dynamics in a Post-Brexit 
Approach ................................................................................................................ 70 
3.4 Empirical Aspects of Brexit-Related Risk Premiums in the UK ............... 75 
3.5 Foreign Direct Investment Dynamics: Empirical Findings ....................... 82 
3.6 Economic Policy Conclusions ................................................................... 84 
3.7 Appendix B: Key Findings of a Legal and Economic Analysis of a Hard 
Brexit  ................................................................................................................... 87 
3.8 Appendix C: Selected Findings Kadiric/Korus (2019) .............................. 87 
3.9 References .................................................................................................. 89 
II 
 
4. The determinants of sovereign risk premiums in the UK and the European 
government bond market: The impact of Brexit .................................................. 92 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 92 
4.2 Theoretical background and related literature ........................................... 95 
4.3 Data description ....................................................................................... 105 
4.4 Empirical Results ..................................................................................... 107 
4.4.1 Methodology ........................................................................................ 107 
4.4.2 Direct effects of Brexit referendum announcement ............................. 111 
4.4.3 Time-varying aspects ........................................................................... 114 
4.5 Robustness check ..................................................................................... 117 
4.6 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 120 
4.7 Appendix D .............................................................................................. 122 
4.8 References ................................................................................................ 123 
5. Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................... 130 
5.1 Policy Implications .................................................................................. 130 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research ............................................................. 133 








List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Framework of the thesis ............................................................................ 7 
Figure 2.1: Overview of credit spreads ...................................................................... 23 
Figure 2.2: Market Volume, UK Corporate Bond Market (Overall Economy, Daily 
Data, January 2013 – March 2018) ............................................................. 57 
Figure 2.3: Market Volume, EA Corporate Bond Market (Overall Economy, Daily 
Data, January 2013 – March 2018) ............................................................. 57 
Figure 3.1: OBR’s 2020 real GDP growth forecast revision ..................................... 66 
Figure 3.2: Current account balance as percentage of GDP (OBR, October 2018) .. 68 
Figure 4.1: Sovereign bond yield spreads (daily, Oct. 2014 – March 2019) ........... 106 
Figure 4.2: Credit default swap premium on 10-year government bond (daily, Oct. 
2014 – March 2019) .................................................................................. 122 
Figure 4.3: Risk aversion variables by comparison (daily, Oct. 2014 – March 2019)






List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Explanatory variables and expected sign .................................................. 28 
Table 2.2: The impact of the Brexit referendum on UK credit spreads (Overall 
Economy) .................................................................................................... 30 
Table 2.3: The impact of the Brexit referendum on UK credit spreads (Financial 
Sector) ......................................................................................................... 32 
Table 2.4: The impact of the Brexit referendum on UK credit spreads (Non-Financial 
Sector) ......................................................................................................... 33 
Table 2.5: The impact of the Brexit referendum on EA credit spreads (Overall 
Economy) .................................................................................................... 35 
Table 2.6: The impact of the Brexit referendum on EA credit spreads (Financial 
Sector) ......................................................................................................... 38 
Table 2.7: The impact of the Brexit referendum on EA credit spreads (Non-Financial 
Sector) ......................................................................................................... 39 
Table 2.8: The impact of other Brexit-related events on UK credit spreads (Overall 
Economy) .................................................................................................... 41 
Table 2.9: The impact of other Brexit-related events on EA credit spreads (Overall 
Economy) .................................................................................................... 42 
Table 2.10: UK credit spreads (Overall Economy) ................................................... 45 
Table 2.11: UK credit spreads (Financial Sector) ...................................................... 47 
Table 2.12: UK credit spreads (Non-Financial Sector) ............................................. 48 
Table 2.13: EA credit spreads (Overall Economy) .................................................... 50 
Table 2.14: EA credit spreads (Financial Sector) ...................................................... 52 
Table 2.15: EA credit spreads (Non-Financial Sector) .............................................. 53 
Table 3.1: Selected estimates of economic loss for the UK in the case of Hard Brexit 
(Difference in GDP (in %) from baseline scenario by 2030) ..................... 65 
Table 3.2: Explanatory variables and expected signs ................................................ 78 
Table 3.3: The impact of the Brexit referendum on UK credit spreads (Overall 
Economy), Rating Category AA................................................................. 80 
Table 3.4: The impact of the Brexit referendum on UK credit spreads (Overall 
Economy), Rating Category BBB .............................................................. 81 
Table 3.5: Summary of estimation results for credit spread indices in the UK and EA 
corporate bond markets (maturities as indicated, figures in brackets are 
standard errors) ........................................................................................... 87 
Table 4.1: Variable description and expected sign .................................................. 111 
Table 4.2: The impact of the Brexit referendum on risk premium .......................... 113 
Table 4.3: Time-varying effects of the Brexit referendum ...................................... 116 




1.1 Basic Perspectives and Motivation 
On June 23rd, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted in a referendum to leave the 
European Union (EU) – an event that is now widely referred to as “Brexit”. For the 
vast majority of observers, this decision in favour of leave came, to a large extent, 
rather unexpectedly. Brexit represents a unique shock as, for the first time ever, a 
member state of the EU is in fact going to leave. Hence, the range of historical 
experience with similar events is quite limited. This restricts the extent to which 
previous analyses can be used in order to understand the effects of Brexit. 
Nevertheless, understanding its effects – and the Brexit process (the UK officially left 
the EU on January 31, 2020) – on individual firms, economic sectors and the economy 
in general is of a great importance for corporate managers, economists and policy 
makers. To some extent, Brexit stands for uncertainty, namely in the very early stages, 
but as alternative scenarios become clearer and companies, including banks in the UK 
and Eurozone (and economic agents in countries outside of the EU), start to adjust, 
various risk aspects appear on the radar of decision-makers. The picture emerging in 
financial markets in the UK and the Eurozone countries reveals important information.  
Taking financial market adjustment dynamics and the new spreads in corporate and 
government bond markets into account could allow firms, investors and policy makers 
to prepare for and mitigate the impact of Brexit, to manage the exposure of individual 
firms, particular sectors and the economy as a whole in a transitory environment of 
higher economic and political risk and to find the best possible policy mix in order to 
moderate its aftermath. Against this background, the present study – with the 
subsequent three articles – analyses the effects of the Brexit vote on risk conditions in 
international bond markets, with the principle aim of extending existing knowledge 
and the literature by introducing new aspects and data as well as discussing the results; 
new empirical findings should help to better understand European and global financial 
market dynamics.  
The UK became a member of the European Communities (EC) 1973 and was strongly 
involved in the launch of the Single Market in 1993. Being a member of the EU had a 
considerable influence on the UK’s economic development. While the UK’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita relative to the that of the EU founding members 
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declined steadily from 1945 to 1972, it was relatively stable between 1973 and 2010 
(Campos and Coricelli (2015) and Campos et al. (2019)). Since becoming a member 
of the EU in 1973, GDP per capita in the UK has doubled, increasing more than in 
other non-EU English speaking countries over the same period, including the United 
States (OECD (2016), p.8). Having access to the European Single Market – created in 
1993 – with its free movement of goods, services, capital and people is important not 
only for free trade in goods and services (including financial services) but also for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and immigration. Moreover, the EU has trade 
agreements with more than 60 other countries and prospective agreements under 
negotiation with a further 67 economies. During its 47 years of membership, a set of 
complex relationships between the UK and the economies of other EU member states 
developed. In particular, the UK developed its traditionally strong banking sector – 
broadly speaking, the financial sector – since the 1980s: at first through financial 
market liberalization under the governments of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
later followed by impulses from the EU Single Market, notably high levels of intra-
EU capital mobility coupled with the principle of the single passport for banks (a bank 
active in one EU member country can offers services throughout the whole EU). Thus, 
the departure of the UK from the EU would cause a significant loss for both sides. 
When considering how the outcome of the Brexit referendum may affect risk 
conditions in the financial markets, at least two aspects should be reflected upon. 
Firstly, the indirect effects through the future expected impact on the real economy, 
and secondly, the direct effects through an increase in economic policy uncertainty – 
possibly associated with a new fiscal and monetary policy mix where the Bank of 
England is largely politically independent. According to the dividend discount model 
of Gordon and Shapiro (1956), expectations about future effects on the real economy 
caused by the Brexit vote will immediately affect financial assets. The effects of Brexit 
on the economies of the UK and other EU member states were debated intensively in 
the community of economic experts, banks, industrial and financial lobby groups as 
well as governments – prior to the vote in June 2016; and the relevant effects are still 
being debated. However, it is hard to forecast the magnitude of those effects, since 
those would largely depend on the outcome of the negotiations about the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK – due to the  economic shock due to the 
coronavirus pandemic in 2020, a postponement of the effective leave date from the EU 
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Single Market, envisaged by the Johnson government to be at the end of 2020, is still 
a possibility (the papers in this study do not cover any coronavirus shock perspectives). 
Nevertheless, many economists – one may say a clear majority – agreed that the short-
, medium- and long-term net economic effects of leaving the EU were likely to be 
negative and substantial (Welfens (2017) and IMF (2016a, 2016b))1. A recent study 
by the Bank of England (2018) indicates that in no-deal no-transition scenario, the 
medium-term real income loss could be between 7.75% and 10.5% over five years.  
According to the IMF (2016b, p.9) the potential economic impacts of the Brexit vote 
on the British and remaining EU economies can be expected through the following 
channels: trade in goods and services, investment, productivity, immigration and fiscal 
costs. Regarding the trade channel, the most important aspect is that the UK would 
probably lose its access to the European Single Market and preferential access to other 
non-EU markets. Trade between the UK and the EU would become more costly and 
trade agreements with non-EU countries might be less advantageous and take a long 
time to conclude. Nearly half of UK goods and services exports go to the EU (about 
63% are linked to EU membership) and accounted for about 13% of UK GDP in 2014 
(IMF (2016b), p.11). Brexit is likely to increase barriers to trade and financial flows 
(via higher tariffs, stricter border controls and rules of origin checks, increased cross-
country regulation differences and non-tariff measures) leading to higher trading costs 
and thus welfare losses.  
Moreover, the European Single Market assures the principle of mutual recognition and 
the so-called single passport. UK financial firms may lose their passport to provide 
financial services to the Single Market. The financial sector in the UK appears to have 
taken outstanding advantages of the passport, since it has grown considerably in recent 
decades becoming a key component of the British economy2. Financial services are of 
particular importance to the UK economy accounting for about 7% of output and 4% 
of employment in 2015 (OECD (2016), p.14). London, and the wider UK, is the 
leading global international financial and related professional service centre with a 
trade surplus in financial services of £63bn in 2015 (ca. 3.3 percent of UK’s GDP), 
which was more than the combined surpluses of the next three leading countries, 
                                                 
1 For further details on studies and their projections, please see Appendix 3 in IMF (2016b). 
2 The UK trade in financial services as a percentage of GDP has risen much faster than the EU and the 
OECD averages, see Bank of England (2015).  
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namely the United States, Switzerland and Luxemburg (House of Commons (2018), 
p.4). About a third of the UK’s financial services exports are to the EU. Thus, the 
Brexit vote would have immense implications for the financial service sector, an 
economic sector which is critical to the UK economy. Several studies point out that 
financial sectors in both in the UK and the EU would be most affected by Brexit (see 
Schiereck et al. (2016), Ramiah et al. (2017) and Hill et al. (2019)). Though the UK 
would be most affected by an exit, the EU27 would similarly experience negative 
effects from reduced trade in financial services3. Any effects on UK financial sector 
and markets will also have outward spillovers to other EU economies4. Some of the 
key financial sector activities which serve EU27 clients are provided out of London, 
for example, derivatives clearing and investment banking activities are reliant on the 
UK to a significant extent (ECB (2020)). A disruption of these interdependences 
between the EU27 and the UK generated by Brexit would entail additional costs for 
both.  
Furthermore, the European Single Market is very important for the UK’s attractiveness 
with regard to foreign direct investment (FDI) of both EU as well as non-EU investors. 
Almost half of the FDI received by the UK comes from the EU. Brexit would likely 
bring higher barriers to the UK’s inward FDI blocking foreign capital and innovation 
that would require costly domestic investment and cause welfare loses (Dhingra et al. 
(2016) and McGrattan and Waddle (2020)). In addition, the UK would lose its benefit, 
from the perspective of non-EU multinationals, as an attractive point-of-access to the 
Single Market that it has previously enjoyed as an EU member country. If access to 
the Single Market would be lost, lower FDI inflows seem unavoidable. In the case of 
a hard Brexit, the UK would receive almost half of their FDI inflows from other 
European countries, which could otherwise be expected, in the long run (Welfens and 
Baier (2018)). In their subsequent study, Baier and Welfens (2019) confirm the 
expected FDI pattern showing that in the wake of the Brexit referendum, FDI inflows 
to the UK banking sector have declined. Since trade and investment are important 
                                                 
3 In August 2016, the UK accounts for 78% of foreign exchange turnover, 74% of OTC interest rate 
derivatives and 85% of hedge fund assets, 49% of private equity funds raised, 30% of equity market 
capitalisation and 26% of bank lending in the EU, see DGIP (2017, p.9).  
4 Financial links show that Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Malts and Ireland are most exposed, 
see Appendix 4 in IMF (2016b).  
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drivers of long-term GDP growth, Brexit would cause lower levels of openness and 
innovation, weakening technical progress and productivity in the UK.  
Additionally, EU membership allows the free movement of natural persons. Out of 
around 2.5 million jobs that were added in the UK in 2005-2015, 2.2 million were 
filled by immigrants, with nearly 60% originating from the EU, contributing on 
average 0.7 percentage points to GDP per year since 2005 (OECD (2016), p.26). 
Restriction on immigration would reduce labour force growth (or could even bring 
about a long run decline of the UK labour force if there is considerable outward re-
migration of EU immigrants), reduce productivity overall and therefore potential GDP 
growth and fiscal revenues (IMF (2016b)). Using a Computable General Equilibrium 
model with an integrated Melitz (2003) framework, Jafari and Britz (2020) find that 
about two-thirds of the Brexit impacts are due to the consequences of a reduced labour 
force - suggesting that labour force development will be a key issue in determining 
impacts post-Brexit.  
The UK was a net contributor to the EU budget at a cost of around 0.3% of GDP per 
year – an amount that could be saved when the UK leaves the EU (IMF (2016a)). 
However, the negative Brexit shock which causes losses in terms of GDP would imply 
lower economic activity and thus generate reduced tax revenues that would most likely 
offset these post-Brexit expenditure savings on the part of the British government. 
According to Emmerson et al. (2016), even a relatively small reduction in national 
income of only 0.6 percent would outweigh the saving of the EU budget contribution 
and raise the UK budget deficit substantially. There is some potential for further 
deregulation in the UK upon leaving the EU that might partially outweigh losses from 
reduced access to the Single Market. However, the range seems quite limited, since 
the UK already ranks amongst the most liberalized markets in the world (see IMF 
(2016b), p.21).  
In addition to all of the above, an increase in economic policy uncertainty induced by 
the UK’s decision to leave the EU can itself affect financial markets directly. In the 
theoretical finance literature, Pastor and Veronesi (2012) identify two types of 
uncertainty related to future government policy. First, so-called political uncertainty - 
defined as uncertainty about whether the prevailing government policy will change. 
Second, so-called impact uncertainty, which refers to uncertainty about the impact that 
a new government policy will have on the profitability of the private sector. Hence, 
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there is uncertainty about future government action, as well as uncertainty about the 
economic effects of those actions. They find that stock prices fall at the announcement 
of a policy change and that these reactions are weak if the change is widely anticipated, 
but they can be strong if the markets are caught by surprise (e.g., in the case of Brexit).  
The Brexit vote led to substantial disruption in the political scene, resulting 
resignations at the highest levels, first of then Prime Minister David Cameron followed 
by that of his successor in office, Prime Minister Theresa May. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, the UK’s decision to leave the EU is strongly associated with a rise in 
economic, political, and institutional uncertainty, which is projected to have negative 
macroeconomic consequences, especially in the UK and advanced EU economies 
(IMF, 2016c). Firms have to make important economic choices based on the expected 
future economic policy decisions of their government. UK firms and the British 
economy face higher economic policy uncertainty, for example concerning the UK’s 
future legal and regulatory framework, international trading agreements and 
immigration policy (Hill et al. (2019)).  
Several studies have already developed and used different indicators in order to 
measure the uncertainty triggered by Brexit. Baker et al. (2016) developed a new index 
of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) based on media reports. The EPU index for the 
UK rose to extraordinary levels following the referendum, far exceeding the levels 
reached during the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis. Using the EPU for the UK, Belke et al. (2018) find that policy 
uncertainty after the 23rd June 2016 induced huge spillovers to financial markets, 
which exceeded all previous historical maxima. Bloom et al. (2018) use a newly 
created firm-level survey, the Decision Maker Panel (DMP), launched in August 2016 
by the Bank of England, Stanford University and the University of Nottingham. They 
find that Brexit provided a major and persistent uncertainty shock particularly in 
industries that are more dependent on trade with the EU and on EU migrant labour. In 
a subsequent study, Bloom et al. (2019) confirm these results concluding that the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU has generated a large, broad and long-lasting increase in 
uncertainty.  
Using a general equilibrium model of government policy choice, Pastor and Veronesi 
(2013) find that political uncertainty increases the equity risk premium. Greater 
uncertainty leads to an increase of the risk associated with any investment, since the 
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pay-off of the investment is less certain. Investors would typically seek compensation 
for bearing the higher risk and would therefore demand a higher risk premium (see 
Christiano et al. (2014), Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Arellano et al. (2019)). 
Consequentially, in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum result 
announcement, financial markets may anticipate significant negative economic effects 
from the exit vote. Risk premiums would be likely to go up leading to a marked 
deterioration in financial conditions and subsequently to higher funding costs. The 
resulting uncertainty could lead to more difficult financial conditions in other 
European economies as well. Another risk could even be that the UK’s exit from the 
EU causes a repricing of risk more generally, for the UK as well as for remaining EU 
member states.  
The present thesis analyses the effects of Brexit on risk premiums in the corporate and 
sovereign bond markets in the UK and the EU, respectively; including time-varying 
aspects. Each chapter is an autonomous study. While Chapters 2 and 3 are co-authored 
papers, Chapter 4 is based on a single-authored paper. The following Figure 1.1 
illustrates how all papers are connected with each other. A key aspect in Chapter 2 is 
to determine and quantify the impact of Brexit-related events on risk condition in the 
UK and the Euro Area (EA) corporate bond markets over different maturities and 
economic sectors. The subsequent study in Chapter 3 is based on this approach and 
extends it by additionally analysing Brexit effects on different rating categories in the 
UK’s corporate bond market. In contrast, the analysis in Chapter 4 focuses on Brexit 
vote effects on sovereign risk premiums in the UK and the European government bond 
markets and potential changes in the investors risk assessment.  





In the following subchapter, a brief summary of the studies which comprise the present 
dissertation is presented.  
Chapter 2: The effects of Brexit on credit spreads: Evidence from UK and 
Eurozone corporate bond markets 
This chapter presents the paper “The effects of Brexit on credit spreads: Evidence from 
UK and Eurozone corporate bond markets” which was co-authored with Arthur Korus. 
The paper was published by Springer in the journal International Economics and 
Economic Policy (January 2019, Vol. 16, Issue 1).  
A key aspect is to determine and quantify the impact of Brexit-related events, including 
the result of the Brexit referendum itself, on the risk premiums in the UK and EA 
corporate bond markets, respectively. Estimation results indicate that only the actual 
announcement of the UK referendum result had an effect on credit spreads in the UK 
and EA. In order to investigate more specific sector-related effects of the referendum 
result, differentiated analysis for the financial and non-financial sector is conducted. 
Empirical findings show that the impact of the Brexit vote on risk premiums is higher 
for financials than for non-financials, especially in the EA corporate bond market 
where credit spreads in the non-financial sector were hardly or not at all affected by 
the referendum result. Finally, in order to consider the potential changing evaluation 
of the determinants of corporate bond spreads due to altering risk pricing triggered by 
the Brexit referendum result, the sample is split in to the period before and the period 
after the referendum. Our findings indicate that the relevance of determining variables 
changes over time and that particularly the effects of credit default risk is far stronger 
and plays a significant role in the post-referendum period in both the UK and the EA.  
This paper provides several contributions to the existing literature on the determinants 
of corporate bond yield spreads. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first to analyse 
the impact of Brexit on the risk premium in the UK and the EA corporate bond markets. 
It also extends the existing literature on corporate yield spreads in the UK and EA, 
which to date is rather scarce. It analyses the UK and EA corporate bond markets 
simultaneously allowing for a direct comparison of the two markets and is the first to 
make use of the forward swap market as an explanatory variable for credit spreads. 
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Chapter 3: EU28 Capital Market Perspectives of a Hard BREXIT: Theory, 
Empirical Findings and Policy Options 
This chapter is based on the paper “EU28 Capital Market Perspectives of a Hard 
BREXIT: Theory, Empirical Findings and Policy Options” which was co-authored 
with Paul Welfens (first author), Fabian Baier, Arthur Korus and Tian Xiong, and is a 
De Gruyter publication in the journal The Economists’ Voice (September 2019, Vol. 
16, Issue 1).  
The likelihood of a no-deal Brexit has strongly increased after the current Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson replaced Theresa May in July 2019. A “quasi no-deal Brexit” 
– the Johnson government’s UK-EU deal of late 2019 plus no adequate post-Brexit 
EU-UK trade and cooperation treaty – would bring a strong long run welfare loss for 
the UK and also a recession. Key aspects covered refer to the cost of leaving the EU 
without a deal and in particular the implications for corporate bond risk premiums in 
the UK. The empirical analysis in mainly based on the approach discussed in Chapter 
2. Additionally, two rating categories are incorporated in the analysis; AA rated bonds 
as being representative of a very good credit quality and BBB rated bonds as 
representative of a lower credit quality, since this is the lowest investment grade 
category. Estimation results suggest that in the case of the Brexit referendum, market 
participants did not make a distinction between AA and BBB rated bonds, i.e., 
corporate bond spreads were affected by the announcement of the referendum result 
irrespective of the respective rating category.  
Chapter 4: The Determinants of Sovereign Risk Premiums in the UK and the 
European Government Bond Market: The Impact of Brexit 
This chapter presents the paper “The Determinants of Sovereign Risk Premiums in the 
UK and the European Government Bond Market: The Impact of Brexit” where the 
author of the present dissertation holds single authorship. The paper was published by 
the European Institute for International Economic Relations (EIIW/University of 
Wuppertal) as Discussion Paper No. 271 (March 2020).  
Focusing on risk premiums, a key aspect of this study is to analyse recent 
developments in the British and European government bond markets with reference to 
the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union. The risk premium is 
expected to express the risk conditions exposure of the UK and selected EA countries. 
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Several findings are of a particular interest. The empirical results show that the 
announcement of the Brexit referendum result led to an immediate increase of the risk 
premium in the UK and some other selected European government bond markets. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that there is a considerable change in risk pricing after 
the announcement of the referendum result. Credit default risk and the risk aversion 
play a much more important role in the post-referendum period than they did prior to 
the vote, particularly in the United Kingdom. Finally, estimation results also indicate 
that using a regional rather than an international measure of risk aversion might be 
more appropriate in order to capture investors’ risk assessment, especially when 
analysing Euro Area countries.  
This paper differs from the existing literature in that, to the best of my knowledge, it 
is the first study that focuses on the potential effects of the Brexit referendum result on 
risk premiums in the UK and European government bond markets. Furthermore, it 
extends the existing literature on the effects of Brexit on financial markets. It analyses 
risk premiums in the UK and the EA government bond markets simultaneously which 
allows for direct comparison of Brexit effects in both of those markets. Moreover, 
estimating the period before and the period after the announcement of the Brexit 
referendum result enables an analysis of potential changes in investors’ risk 
assessment. Finally, this study is the first to use a newly developed regional risk 
aversion variable in order to capture the willingness of investors to bear county-
specific risks. 
At the bottom line, the chapters in the present study contribute to the field of both 
theoretical and empirical analysis in the Brexit debate and shed new light both on 
corporate bonds risk premiums in the UK and the Eurozone as well as on government 
bonds yields in the context of the Brexit process. The papers have been presented at 
numerous international conferences and at EIIW workshops and the author is grateful 
for the opportunity to have presented part of the papers in a Bundesbank-sponsored 
project of the EIIW. Chapter 5 presents selected policy conclusions and points out key 
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5. Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter, several policy implications, limitations and future research 
recommendations which can be derived from the papers presented in the underlying 
dissertation will be explicated. A thorough understanding of the effects of the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU is an important issue for academics, financial economists and 
policymakers alike. Over the last four years, several issues related to the Brexit process 
and its effects have been analysed. This thesis focuses on the impact of Brexit on risk 
premiums in corporate and government bond markets in the UK and the EU, 
respectively. Although corporate bond markets are less liquid than equity or foreign 
exchange markets, they still play a very important role for capital raising from the 
perspective of companies and are a reliable indicator for risk conditions in the market. 
Moreover, since sovereign bond markets are generally used as a benchmark for asset 
pricing and asset allocation purposes, they play a crucial role in modern financial 
markets. Hence, the potential effects of determining variables on risk premiums in 
corporate as well as in government bond markets are issues of great importance.  
5.1 Policy Implications 
The empirical results presented in chapter 2 and chapter 3 show that the very 
announcement of the result of the Brexit referendum had an impact on risk conditions 
leading to higher risk premiums in the UK corporate bond market. Additionally, a 
further analysis of more sector-related and rating-specific effects find that both 
financial and non-financial sectors were affected by Brexit and that market participants 
made little distinction between very good and lower credit quality. Hence, the 
empirical findings suggest that the referendum result had a wide and deep impact on 
financial conditions affecting yield spreads in corporate markets irrespective of the 
economic sector or rating category. Persistent upside pressure on risk premiums could, 
in fact, have a major impact on many companies’ marginal funding costs reducing 
their profitability and thus willingness to invest.  
The UK government may raise the issue of reducing the statutory corporate tax rate in 
order to counteract the negative effects of increasing risk premiums on firms’ 
profitability and investment and in the end on dampening output growth. A reduction 
of corporate tax could generate strong effects on FDI inflows, particularly greenfield 
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FDI, which would be important for capital accumulation and productivity growth. 
However, this option is highly disputable since the statutory corporate tax rate in the 
UK has already reached a very low level, competing with other OECD tax haven 
countries (Welfens and Baier (2018)). At the same time, lower tax revenue growth 
would have considerable effects on the fiscal outlook in the UK implying a higher 
credit default risk and an additional upward pressure on UK government bonds.  
One of the major challenges for the UK in order to moderate the effects of Brexit and 
its aftermath could be an increase of the risk premium for corporate bonds in the 
banking sector in particular. A higher risk premium may imply an upward shift of the 
supply curve in the loan market leading to lower credit growth, thus having negative 
effects on output growth (Bernanke and Blinder (1988)). In order to countervail these 
negative effects, the British government could undertake financial deregulation. A 
deregulation of the financial sector could attract higher capital inflows into the banking 
sector and stimulate the financial services sector as a strategic growth pillar of the UK 
economy. However, financial deregulation would imply lower prospects for the UK’s 
banks to retain broad regulatory equivalence from the EU. Additionally, such a policy 
decision may push other financial centres (e.g., New York) to pursue more 
deregulation putting increasing pressure on the EU to also deregulate and in the end 
causing a regulatory “race to the bottom” that would be harmful to the stability of the 
global financial system (Baier and Welfens (2019)).  
Estimation results of the analysis presented in chapter 2 indicate that risk premiums in 
the EA non-financial sector were hardly or not at all affected by the Brexit vote. 
However, to conclude that the UK’s exit would have no effects on risk premiums in 
the non-financial sector in the EA corporate bond market would be misleading. Due to 
spillover effects and a strong cross-sector interdependence between the financial and 
non-financial sectors it is plausible to assume that Brexit would have both medium- 
and long-term effects on the non-financial sector in the EA too. In addition, many 
global investment banks which currently serve the EA market from London support 
EA non-financial corporations to access the global financial market. In order to address 
these concerns, the EU should foster the integration of EU capital markets. The capital 
market union (CMU) would support investment and private risk sharing and thus meet 
challenges related to market fragmentation and the potential reduction in market depth 
and efficiency resulting from Brexit (ECB (2020)). Moreover, the CMU would further 
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increase the relevance and prominence of the European capital market on the global 
stage.  
A key aspect of the study presented in chapter 4 is the analysis of risk premiums in the 
UK and European government bond markets with reference to the UK´s decision to 
leave the EU. Empirical results show that the announcement of the Brexit referendum 
result led to an immediate increase of the risk premiums in the UK and some other 
selected European government bond markets. Additionally, there is a considerable 
change in the importance of the determinants of sovereign bond spreads due to the 
change in the risk pricing triggered by the Brexit referendum result, particularly in the 
UK. In the period after the referendum, the credit default risk and risk aversion play 
much more important roles than they did prior to the vote. The strong importance of 
credit risk indicates that the Brexit decision had an effect on the creditworthiness of 
the UK. Hence, a more aggressive fiscal approach, in order to milden the aftermath of 
Brexit, would have further positive effects on credit risk leading again to higher risk 
premiums. Therefore, any policy easing decision considered by British government 
should be temporary and fixed within a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan 
(IMF (2018)).  
Furthermore, the positive effect of risk aversion shows that the UK’s safe haven status 
is weakening. Most importantly, a loss of market confidence is deemed to lead to an 
increase in long-term real interest rates and debt service costs, partly offsetting the 
stimulus effects of measures taken to deal with the Brexit process and further adding 
to financing pressures. From this perspective, it is all the more important that the 
British government would be able to adopt a consistent macroeconomic policy that 
would help to restore broad confidence on the part of international investors in the UK 
- particularly in the case of a hard Brexit, where a new downgrade of UK government 
bonds due to a negative rating outlook by leading rating agencies (such as S&P and 
Fitch) seems possible. An increase of the risk premium in the sovereign bond market 
would have additional negative effects on the real economy (Gadatsch (2015)). In 
order to combat these negative effects, the Bank of England could try to reduce the 
bank rate and further increase liquidity by implementing conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy measures alike. However, those measures are only 
worth considering as long as they would not endanger the Bank’s mandate to hit the 
inflation target.  
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5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
In order to approximate the corporate credit default risk in the analysis presented in 
chapters 2 and 3, the corresponding CDS premium on government bonds is used due 
to limited access to corporate CDS data. This step implies that only the indirect impact 
of default risk - as a consequence of the risk transfer channel from sovereign to 
corporate - is measured. Recent research in this field has presented strong theoretical 
and empirical evidence for risk transfer from sovereign to corporate (see, e.g., Gomez-
Puig et al. (2019), Augustin et al. (2018) and Bedendo and Colla (2015)). Nonetheless, 
using sovereign CDS as a proxy for corporate default risk might be misleading and not 
perfectly sufficient in order to capture the full variation in the corporate CDS markets. 
Moreover, Breckenfelder and Schwaab (2018) argue that such effects tend to be rather 
time-, country- and sector-specific, being stronger when a country faces a sharp 
increase in its expected default risk. In summary, including corporate rather than 
sovereign CDS would enrich the empirical model and add additional quality to the 
analysis.  
Furthermore, in chapter 2 the impact of the Brexit vote on seven different business 
sectors, of which three are financial and four are non-financial business sectors, is 
analysed. Unfortunately, the model provided unstable results; as for analysing business 
sectors, more specific data at a microeconomic level are required. Nevertheless, it 
would be of particular interest to understand Brexit-related effects on sectoral risk 
premiums since changes in relative sectoral financing costs would contribute to shifts 
in medium-term and long run structural changes. In fact, due to diverse risk conditions 
in each business sector, and given that different business sectors are influenced by 
macroeconomic instabilities in different ways, it may be assumed that risk premium 
response differs across sectors.  
Hence, an interesting question would be to what extent business sectors in the UK and 
the EA corporate bond market are facing higher risk premiums triggered by the Brexit 
process. In some sectors, there could be a homogenous risk premium development, 
while  other sectors experience a different, more varied, development path. This would 
depend especially on the analytical results and changing risk perception of 
international investors. Naturally, country-specific aspects would also play a role due 
to a different trade intensity between the UK and respective EU member states. It is to 
be expected that sectors in the UK, which are relatively strongly dependent on trade 
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intensity between the UK and the EU, will face higher risk premiums than sectors that 
are less linked with the European single market (Davies and Studnicka (2018)). 
However, companies in the non-tradeable sectors could also be affected since Brexit 
is expected to have a rather significant negative effect in the UK and a modestly 
negative effect in the EU. Estimating the determinants of corporate bond yield spreads 
in times of market turmoil is of particular interest for companies and investors to 
illuminate the conditions under which the refinancing of debt is particularly costly and 
to generate information, if possible, about the variables which should be monitored in 
future with the intention of possibly reducing refinancing costs. Hence, an advanced 
detailed analysis of specific business sectors, for example banking, financial services, 
automobile, ICT etc., would generate further information of particular interest for 
corresponding companies in the relevant sectors. 
The analysis in chapter 4 elaborates on the impact of the Brexit referendum result on 
risk premiums in the UK and selected EA countries. While nine of the largest EA 
economies are included in the sample, subsequent research in this field might consider 
extending the sample of countries in order to meet concerns regarding high 
heterogeneity of the euro area. The study presented herein focuses on the effects of 
Brexit in the long-term, namely 10-year government bond markets. Although yields 
on 10-year sovereign bonds play a key role in the monetary policy transmission 
process and are generally used as a benchmark for asset pricing purposes, one might 
consider incorporating additional maturities in the research, for example 2-year and 5-
year maturities. This extension could help to better understand the dispersal of Brexit 
effects over time.  
Finally, since an unexpected event (i.e., shock) can have different effects on global 
and regional financial markets, a newly developed regional risk aversion variable is 
used in chapter 4 in order to account for investor sentiment. The new variable is 
calculated as a pure corporate yield spread and has several advantages. The empirical 
results indicate that using regional rather than international risk aversion might be 
more appropriate in order to capture investors’ risk assessment. Hence, an interesting 
avenue for further research would be to extend and apply this approach to other 




The effective implementation of Brexit – read the end of the United Kingdom’s single 
market membership – in 2020 (or if postponed in 2021) could also be a new focus for 
future research. Even beyond this historical date, there will be decisions to be reached 
about the future EU-UK trade relationship and the results of these negotiations could 
also be analysed with respect to the impact on sectoral risk premiums. One will have 
to observe how the EU27 countries react in the medium term with respect to the Brexit 
challenge; small EU countries may possibly decide to increasingly cooperate in order 
to secure more political weight within the EU. Finally, the role of UK banking FDI in 
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